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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
AMANA I SA and 
SHEIK MOHAMMED AL-AMOUDI 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAIRNWOOD GROUP, LLC, 
CAIRNWOOD CAPITAL 











* PENDLETON, LAIRD P. PENDLETON, 
KIRK P. PENDLETON, and THAYER B. * FILED IN OFFI~~ 
PENDLETON. * 
* 
SEP 2 '5 2009 f'-. Defendants, * 
* 
LlI:r-U I F. ~!:'=I1K~::;UPERIOR COURT 
UlTON COUNTY, GA 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT CHARLES PHILLIPS 
On August 26, 2009, the parties appeared before this Court on Defendants' 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Charles Phillips. After reviewing the briefs of the 
parties, Mr. Phillips' report and his deposition, the record of the case, and the 
arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts 
This case arises out of Plaintiffs' investment in the Cairnwood Global Technology 
Fund ("CGTF"), a fund created by the individual defendants, sponsored by Cairnwood 
Group, LLC and managed by Cairnwood Capital Management, LLC. Plaintiffs allege 
that they were fraudulently induced to invest in CGTF. On April 13, 2009, Plaintiffs' filed 
a Third Amended Complaint asserting counts for fraud, civil conspiracy to defraud, 
negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Georgia RICO Act. On June 22,2009, 
all Defendants except Lane Pendleton moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' 
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damages expert, Charles Phillips. On, August 14, 2009, Defendant Lane Pendleton 
also moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert Charles Phillips and adopted 
his co-Defendants' arguments as his own. 
II. The Daubert Standard 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1, which 
requires a trial court to apply the federal Daubert rule in assessing the admissibility of 
expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
Therefore, federal authority, as well as Georgia law, is relevant to the question of 
admissibility. See, Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271 (2008). Pursuant to 
both O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 and Daubert, once a court determines that "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," an expert may give 
opinion testimony so long as such testimony is reliable and relevant. O.C.G.A. §24-9-
67.1; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-595 (1993). O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 defines reliable and 
relevant testimony as testimony that is based upon sufficient facts or data, is the 
product of reliable methods, and is the product of a reliable application of the methods 
to the facts of the case. 
The Daubert standard is liberal and favors admissibility. See,~, KSP 
Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 2008 WL 182260 (N.D. OH 2008) ("As commentators have 
noted, Rule 702 evinces a liberal approach regarding admissibility of expert testimony. 
Under this liberal approach, expert testimony is presumptively admissible."); In re Scrap 
Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 530 (2008) ("[R]ejection of expert testimony is 
the exception, rather than the rule."); see also, Mason, 283 Ga. at 279 (holding that it is 
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"proper to consider and give weight to constructions placed on the federal rules by 
federal courts when applying or construing" D.C.G.A. § 24-7-67.1 because the Georgia 
statute was based upon Rule 702 and Daubert). 
The burden to establish admissibility falls upon the proffering party. Netguote, 
Inc. v. Byrd, 2008WL 2442048, at *6 (D. Colo. 2008). In a Daubert inquiry, the trial 
court acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining whether the expert is qualified to testify. 
See, ~, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McDowell, 294 Ga. App. 871,872 (2008). 
III. The Daubert Analysis 
a. Qualifications of Mr. Phillips 
Defendants do not contest Mr. Phillips's qualifications to serve as an expert 
witness. Rather, Defendants seek to exclude Mr. Phillips's testimony on grounds that it 
is unreliable and irrelevant. The Court finds that Mr. Phillips possesses proper 
qualifications to allow him to serve as an expert witness on damages in this case. 
b. Reliability and Relevance of Mr. Phillips's Opinion 
Defendants argue that Mr. Phillips's expert opinion should be excluded because 
it rests on three faulty legal premises and is, therefore, unreliable and legally irrelevant. 
First, Defendants argue that Mr. Phillips used the wrong measure of damages under 
Georgia law. Defendants maintain that the correct measure of damages is the 
difference between the actual value of the property at the time of purchase and what the 
value would have been if it had been as represented. In opposition, Plaintiffs maintain 
that they are entitled to "damages arising directly and consequential to" the fraud, or as 
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Mr. Phillips described in his rebuttal expert witness report, "the amount of money that 
would restore the Plaintiffs to the position they were in before the investment, less any 
distributions or benefits received due to having made the investment, plus interest." 
Generally, "damages for fraudulent misrepresentation are the difference between 
the value of the thing sold at the time of delivery and what would have been its value if 
the representations made by the defendants had been true." BOO Seidman, LLP v. 
Mindis Acquisition Corp., 276 Ga. 311, 311 fn 1 (2003) (providing the measure of 
damages for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim in an opinion establishing and 
explaining the propriety of a different measure of damages for a negligent 
misrepresentation claim.) However, Georgia courts also recognize that "damages 
arising directly and consequential to a tort are recoverable." Rodrigue v. Mendenhall, 
145 Ga. Appl. 666, 667 (1978) (noting that "[g]enerally, the measure of damages in an 
action for fraud and deceit is the difference between the actual value of the property at 
the time of purchase and what the value would have been if it had been as represented" 
but allowing for additional recovery); see also Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc. v. 
Bryan, 163 Ga. App. 804, 805 (1982) (affirming denials of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial finding that "although the 
evidence in this case does not show the difference in the value of the house at the time 
of the purchase and what its value would have been if appellant's representations had 
been true," the evidence established the cost to repair the damage to plaintiffs' home 
which was the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the jury) . These Georgia 
cases are consistent with The Restatement Second of Torts Section 549 which provides 
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for alternative measures of damages in fraud cases. Therefore, the court finds it 
appropriate for a jury to consider Mr. Phillips's damages calculation. 
Second, Defendants argue that Phillips's opinion is based on the incorrect 
standard of causation. Phillips states in his expert witness report that he has 
"assume[d] causation as claimed by the Plaintiffs." In its Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Court addressed at length the Parties' dueling views of 
causation in this case. While, Plaintiffs must show proximate cause to maintain their 
action for fraud, the Court rejected Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs can only show 
proximate causation in one narrow way which is akin to the requirement of "loss 
causation" under federal securities law. Therefore, Phillips's assumption regarding 
proximate cause is consistent with the Court's finding in its summary judgment order. 
Third, Defendants argue that Phillips incorrectly assumes that prejudgment 
interest is warranted in this case. Phillips assumes that damages in this case are 
"certain and fixed" and, thus, are rightfully considered liquidated damages upon which 
pre-judgment interest accrues. Under Georgia law, liquidated damages "are an amount 
certain and fixed, either by the act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law; 
a sum which cannot be changed by proof." McCorvey Grading & Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Blalock Oil Co., 268 Ga.App. 795, 796 (2004); see also O.C.G.A. 7-4-15. The Court 
finds that the damages at issue in this case may be "changed by proof' and, therefore, 
are not properly considered liqUidated damages. The damages Mr. Phillips calculates 
assume that a jury would find Plaintiffs' damages entirely attributable to Defendants. 
Additionally, issues of valuation persist even as admitted in Mr. Phillips's expert report. 
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Accordingly. Mr. Phillip's testimony as to the propriety of an award of pre-judgment 
interest shall be excluded. 
IV. Conclusion 
Defendants' Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony of Charles Phillips are granted 
in part and denied in part. The Court finds that Mr. Phillips's testimony as to Plaintiffs' 
damages is relevant and reliable and shall be permitted. However, any testimony by 
Mr. Phillips opining that the damages in this case are rightfully characterized as 
liquidated shall be excluded. 
SO ORDERED this 25th day of September, 2009. 
Copies to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs: 
David L. Balser, Esq. 
Gregory S. Brow, Esq. 
McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP 
303 Peachtree ST. NE, Suite 5300 




ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Attorneys for Defendant Lane Pendleton 
John Kenney, Esq., 
Hoguet, Newman, Regal & Kenney, LLP 
10 E. 40th Street, 35th Floor 
New York, NY 10016 
Phone 212-689-8808 
jkenney@hnrklaw.com 
Attorneys for all remaining defendants: 
Michael C. Russ, Esq. 
Emily J. Culpepper, Esq. 
David E. Meadows, Esq. 
King & Spalding LLP 
1180 Peachtree Street 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
(404) 572-4600 
(404) 572-5100 (fax) 
mruss@kslaw.com 
William T. Hangley, Esq. 
Wendy Beetlestone, Esq. 
Paul W. Kaufman, Esq. 
Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin 
One Logan Square, 2th Floor 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
(215) 96-7033 
(215) 568-0300 (fax) 
wth@hangley.com 
wbeetlestone@hangley.com 
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